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If Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) ends up producing just another small step in the 
right direction, it will effectively have failed. With important decisions on the implementation of 
PESCO coming up this fall, now is the time to remain ambitious. It sometimes feels though as if 
the EU is spending an awful lot of time explaining what PESCO is not, instead of explaining why it 
must be so ambitious. PESCO is not about creating a European army. PESCO will notencroach 
on the prerogatives of NATO. One should not have too high expectations of PESCO. 
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These points are not without ground. First, the notion of a European army has become toxic, and 
therefore counterproductive. Presenting PESCO as a step towards a European army will 
generate resistance that would not otherwise be there. Second, Member States have but a single 
set of forces, hence care should of course be taken that the EU and NATO do not create 
competing demands on those forces. As the means are limited, unnecessary duplications of tasks 
and structures should be avoided. Third, expectations management is important. Many times in 
the past, both the EU and NATO have announced grand initiatives with a lot of fanfare, only to 
see them fizzle out quietly. It is understandable that many are sceptical about yet another 
scheme, PESCO. At the same time, others are perhaps too enthusiastic and unrealistic in their 
expectations. It will indeed take a lot of time before PESCO results in a substantial increase of 
military capacity and a significant degree of strategic autonomy. 
By being all too nuanced about it, however, the EU is at risk of undermining PESCO even before 
it has really taken off. The EU should not set unrealistic goals, but it should not sin in the other 
sense either. By setting goals that are too modest in relation to the available means and the 
threats and challenges to Europe's vital interests, the EU risks defeat. Let us be nuanced about 
the nuances, therefore. 
A European army is, in fact, a very good idea. Had the six Member States of the European Coal 
and Steel Community gone through with their plan to create a European Defence Community 
and merged their armed forces into a single European force in the 1950s, things would have 
looked very different today. It is indeed advisable to avoid the use of the words "European army", 
but the EU should stress that the aim of PESCO is to make a real leap forward in European 
defence. That will not be possible just by stepping up cooperation between Member States' 
armed forces. This effectively demands European military integration. National combat units 
must be anchored into permanent multinational formations, with permanent multinational 
command and control arrangements, supported by permanent multinational enablers. In many 
areas, multinational structures will have to replace national structures. The low-hanging fruit 
has already been plucked; now it is time to start chopping off superfluous branches in order for 
t~ tr:;e&:>b!iigrrnNrtstr~tl§~e give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume 
that you are happy with it. Ok 
Complementarity between the EU and NATO is a concern, but it should not be allowed to 
become a constraint. In fact, complementarity is more or less automatic, since the purpose of 
PESCO is to generate military capability. All additional military capability that the EU Member 
States acquire through PESCO, whether it be operated on a national or on a multinational basis, 
ipso facto enters the balance sheet of NATO, since these states are all members or partners of 
the Alliance (except one). In fact, PESCO is the onlyway through which NATO can expect 
significant increases in European capability in key areas, notably strategic enablers. Even if all 
European allies would spend 2% of GDP on defence, they would still not be able to afford capital-
intensive enablers if they would all spend these sums separately - they could only do so if they 
pool their defence effort. In PESCO, the EU now has a mechanism to do just that, and it directly 
serves both the Union and the Alliance. 
Finally, scepticism should not turn into cynicism. There are good grounds for expecting more 
from PESCO than from any previous initiative, because it is fundamentally different. First, it 
truly is Member State-driven: if France and Germany had not initiated it, and then gathered the 
support of other capitals, PESCO would not have been activated. Second, it has been 
institutionalised and therefore cannot simply fizzle out and disappear: it is part of the EU 
machinery now, and every year the Council will assess the National Implementation Plans that 
Member States will have to draw up. Third, for the first time Member States that take the 
initiative can be rewarded with co-funding from the EU budget, thanks to the Commission's 
European Defence Fund. There is, of course, no guarantee that PESCO will deliver: Member 
States have equipped themselves with the tool, now they must put it to good use. But is certainly 
has a very good chance. 
Obviously, capability projects do take a long time. The much talked about next generation 
combat aircraft is a case in point. If an industrial consortium would emerge (which would 
probably have to encompass all, or nearly, of Europe's aerospace industry) that would construct 
the future European combat aircraft, that would be an emblematic achievement for PESCO and 
European defence. But no aircraft will be operational before the 2040s at the earliest, if work on 
it starts today. That is precisely the point to be emphasised: it is because of the long timelines 
that work must be started in earnest as soon as possible. This will be the benchmark against 
which the success or failure of PESCO will be judged: will significant capability projects have 
been launched in the first three to five years after its activation? 
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